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CIVIL RIGHTS-EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-RETROACTIVE RE

of Los Angeles, De
partment of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
LIEF DENIED IN TITLE VII VIOLATION-City

The Equal Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,1 prohibits discrimination by employers on the basis of
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."2 Among the reme
dies which were created to implement the purposes of the Act is
section 706(g), available to individuals injured by employer discrimi
nation. 3 After an individual exhausts the appropriate adminis
trative remedies 4 and a federal district court makes a finding of dis
crimination,5 section 706(g) authorizes the trial court to enjoin the
discriminatory practice and order appropriate relief to individuals.
Appropriate relief includes reinstatement or hiring, with or without
backpay.6
Backpay and similar retroactive relief, awarded to victims of
employer discrimination, are intended to compensate individuals
for monetary losses directly traceable to discriminatory practices. 7
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h (1976). The present statute incorporates the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-261, 86 Stat. 103-13.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
3. ld. § 2000e-5(g).
4. ld. § 2000e-4 provides for the creation of the Equal Employment Opportu
nity Commission (EEOC), which has limited powers of conciliation and intervention
in civil suits brought under Title VII. Once a charge is filed by or on behalf of a per
son claiming to be aggrieved under Title VII, the EEOC serves notice of the charges
on the charged party and conducts an investigation of the complaint. If the EEOC
determines that there is reasonable cause to believe the truth of the charge "the
Commission shaIl endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment
practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion." ld. §
2000e-5(b). If the EEOC is unable to secure compliance it has the authority to bring
a civil action against the party. If the charged party is a government, governmental
agency, or political subdivision and the EEOC has been unsuccessful at securing
compliance with Title VII, the EEOC will refer the case to the Attorney General
who may bring an action in federal district court. If the EEOC or the Justice Depart
ment fails to file a civil action or dismisses the charge, the person claiming to be ag
grieved may file a civil action within 90 days of the individual's notice of the action
taken by the Justice Department or the EEOC. ld. § 2000e-5(f).
5. ld. § 2000e-5(g). The remedy provision may be applied after a finding by the
court "that the res,Pondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging
in an unlawful employment practice...." See text accompanying notes 44-48 infra.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
7. The remedy of back pay is usually viewed as a grant to the district courts of
the equitable power, restorative in nature, to fashion the most complete relief possi

779

780

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:779

The purpose of this relief under Title VII is twofold. 8 First, it is in
tended to make victims of discriminatory employment practices
whole by compensating them for losses suffered. Second, the relief
is intended to eradicate discrimination by discouraging discrimina
tory employment practices.
Courts applying section 706(g) have used a variety of standards
to determine whether backpay should be granted. Results of the
section's application have differed depending on how the courts
weigh various equitable factors and how they interpret the legisla
tive intent underlying the Act. 9 The United States Supreme Court
provided lower courts with guidelines for applying section 706(g)
and with standards to measure the appropriateness of an award of
backpay. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,10 the Court set forth a
strong presumption favoring backpay awards to be applied by trial
courts deciding employment discrimination cases. l1 Recently, how
ever, in City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power v.
Manhart,12 the Supreme Court again addressed the appropriate
ness of a district court's award of retroactive relief, this time re
versing the award of backpay. The Manhart decision complicated
the application of standards for awarding retroactive relief that
were established in Albemarle. Recognizing the confusion caused
by Manhart, this note will analyze the problem of construing sec
tion 706(g) and propose standards by which future awards of retro
active relief should be made.
On June 5, 1973, Marie Manhart and other female em
ployees 13 of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power filed
ble. See Note, Retroactive Seniority as a Remedy for Past Discrimination: Franks v.
Bowman Transportation Co., 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 181, 190 (1976). Some commen
tators classify backpay as a legal remedy, awarded when a claimant proves he or she
has suffered loss of income as a result of an unlawful employment practice. See
Walker, Title VII: Complaint and Enforcement Procedures and Relief and Remedies,
7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 495, 514-15 (1966).
8. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971), where the Supreme
Court stated: "The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from
the language of the statute." The Court has consistently recognized the Congres
sional purposes which are inherent in the language of Title VII. See also Franks v.
Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody,422 U.S. 405, 417-21 (1975); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,
44 (1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,800 (1973).
9. See text accompanying notes 41-54 infra.
10. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
11. See text accompanying notes 55-63 infra.
12. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
13. The plaintiffs included Marie Manhart, a former employee of the depart
ment; four other named present employees of the department; the Committee to Pro
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charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
alleging violations of Title VII;14 Female employees of the depart
ment were required to contribute 14.84 percent higher monthly
contributions to a pension plan 1s than were males of comparable
age, length of service, and salary. IS Plaintiffs claimed that this plan
discriminated against women employees in violation of the Civil
Rights Acts of 1871 and 1964. 17 After an investigation of the com
plaint by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the
Justice Department, the plaintiffs sought an injunction in federal
district court to compel the department to cease requiring discrimi
natory contributions. IS
The district court granted injunctive relief to the plaintiffs,
holding that the unequal contributions to the mandatory retirement
plan violated Title VII.19 The court also granted the plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment on their claim and awarded retroact
ive relief. The backpay award, measured by computing the differ
ence between the amounts female employees and male employees
were required to contribute to the plan, was granted to restore to
the female employees monies lost as a result of the Title VII viola
tion. 2o
tect Women's Retirement Benefits Association, composed of female supervisory em
ployees of the department; and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
Local Union No. 18, an unincorporated labor union whose members included
women employed by the department. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at B-9, City of
Los Angeles, Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
14. Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water and Power, 553 F.2d 581,
584 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 435 U.S. 405 (1978).
15. The pension plan is officially referred to as the Public Employees Retire
ment, Disability and Death Benefit Plan. All employees of the department were re
quired to participate in th~ plan, which was funded and managed by the department.
Each employee made monthly contributions which were matched 1l0% by the de
partment. Id. at 583.
16. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at B-lO.
17. Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water and Power, 553 F.2d 581,
584 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 435 U.S. 405 (1978).
18. Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water and Power, 387 F. Supp.
980 (C.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd in part, vacated in
part, 435 U.S. 405 (1975). For procedures followed, see note 4 supra and accompa
nying text.
19. Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water and Power, 387 F. Supp.
980, 984 (C.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd in part, vacated
in part, 435 U.S. 405 (1978). The district court rejected the defendant department's
argument that the longevity tables were based on "a factor other than sex" which
would bring the unequal contributions under an exception to the Equal Pay Act, 29
U.S.C.A. § 206(d) (1978).
20. For the district'court's determination of the appropriate award, see Petition
er's Brief for Certiorari at B-9-1O. The court awarded the female employees retro
active relief of their excess contributions to the plan made between April 5, 1974 and
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit af
firmed the district court's decision in Manhart. 21 In reviewing the
district court's award of retroactive relief, the appellate court bal
anced "the merits of the plaintiff's claim and the public policy be
hind it . . . against the hardship on a good faith employer. "22 The
court found that the equities favored reimbursement of the female
employees' unequal contributions to the pension plan and, there
fore, upheld the grant of retroactive relief.
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' de
terminations that the pension plan violated Title VII by discrimi
nating against female employees as a class. 23 The Court, however,
reversed the award of retroactive relief, denying the appellees re
imbursement of their disproportionate and excessive contributions
to the pension plan. 24 Despite recognizing that section 706(g) fa
vors restoring economic status to victims of employment discrimiDecember 31, 1974. April 5, 1974 was the date that the EEOC amended its regula
tions, stating in 29 C.F.R. 1604.9(e) (1977) that the fact that the cost of benefits "is
greater with respect to one sex than the other" is not a defense to an action based on
sex discrimination under Title VII. The Los Angeles Department of Water and
Power discontinued the unequal contributions requirement on December 31, 1974 in
response to CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7500 (West Supp. 1979), which directed any city
with a population of over one million to revise existing pension plans so that individ
uals of the same age contributed equally without regard to sex. The statute was ef
fective as ofJanuary 1, 1975.
21. 553 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1976), afI'd in part, vacated in part, 435 U.S. 405
(1978). The court refused the appellant's petition for a rehearing in light of the re
cently released Supreme Court decision, General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125
(1976). There the Court held that an employee benefit plan which did not provide
coverage for pregnancy was not an unfair employment practice prohibited by Title
VII.
22. 553 F.2d at 591. The court applies the test developed in Schaeffer v. San
Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002 (1972): "In the case of damages of this na
ture, a court must balance the various equities between the parties and decide upon
a result which is consistent with the purpose of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act, and the fundamental concepts of fairness." Id. at 1007.
23. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion in which a majority of the Court
concurred. Justices Stewart, White, and Powell concurred in full. Chief Justice
Burger, with Justice Rehnquist joining his opinion, concurred in the Court's denial
of retroactive relief but dissented from the finding that the plan violated Title VII.
Justice Blackmun dissented from the Court's finding of a violation of Title VII,
preferring a posture which would have recognized and resolved the conflict between
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), and Manhart, and concurred in the
denial of the backpay award. Justice Marshall found the retirement plan to violate
Title VII and dissented from the Court's holding denying relief to those plaintiffs af
fected by the plan. Justice Brennan took no part in the decision of the case.
24. 435 U.S. at 718-23. The Court found that the differences in contributions re
quired under the plan violated Title VII by discriminating against individual female
employees because of class wide predictions of longevity. Even if the longevity cal
culations were accurate, the Court held that the policy behind Title VII precluded
employers from treating individuals differently because of a class generalization.
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nation and that backpay should normally be awarded, the Court
denied relief. It focused on the hardships that reimbursement
would cause the employer.25 In analyzing the appropriateness of
this denial, it is necessary to examine the legislative history behind
Title VII and its remedial provisions.
On July 2, 1964, President Johnson signed into law the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 26 This Act was designed to give statutory force
to the constitutional protections afforded to blacks after the Civil
War.27 The legislation was intended to eradicate discrimination by
assuring that blacks would not be hindered from full participation
in sOciety.28 One of the provisions included in the Act was Title
VII, which restricted employers of twenty-five or more employ
ees 29 from discrimination based not only on color, but also on the
classifications of religion, sex,30 and national origin. 31
To aid in carrying out the purpose of Title VII, Congress en
acted section 706(g). The section provided for injunctions to elimi
nate particular discriminatory practices and backpay and rein
statement to compensate individuals for losses suffered because of

25. See text accompanying notes 70-74 infra.
26. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000a-2000h (1976)).
27. See llO CONGo REC. 15865 (1964) (concise explanation of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Chronology of Congressional Action submitted by Senator Humphrey).
See also Vass, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 431
(1966); Note, Standards Governing Backpay Awards for Violations of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,61 CORNELL L. REV. 460,462-65 (1976).
28. On June 19, 1963 President Kennedy addressed Congress regarding the im
portance of the then pending Civil Rights legislation in a message to the House of
Representatives. Referring to the employment provision, Kennedy stated, in part:
Raciai discrimination in employment is especially injurious both to its
victims and to the national economy. It results in a great waste of human re
sources and creates serious community problems. It is, moreover, inconsis
tent with the democratic principle that no man should be denied employ
ment commensurate with his abilities because of race or creed or ancestry.
109 CONGo REc. 3248 (1963).
29. The 1972 amendments to the Act made Title VII applicable to employers of
15 or more employees. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976)).
30. Representative Howard Smith of Virginia, an opponent of the civil rights
legislation, offered a last minute addition proposing an amendment to Title VII
which would make the Act applicable to sex discrimination in employment. llO
CONGo REC. 2577 (1964). A number of commentators have stated, and their views are
supported by the legislative record, that this amendment was introduced to block the
passage of Title VII. See Bernstein & Williams, Title VII and the Problem of Sex
Classifications in Pension Programs, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1216-17 (1974); Lines,
Sex Based Fringe Benefits, 16 J. FAM. L. 489, 499-500 (1977-1978).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
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discriminatory practices. 32 The legislative history of the remedy
provision clearly emphasizes the compensatory purpose of the re
lief: "[T]he scope of relief . . . is intended to make the victims of
unlawful discrimination whole . . . restored to the position where
they would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimina
tion. "33 The focus of section 706(g), therefore, is not concerned
with the hardships on the employer, but with the restoration of the
economic status of the victims of discrimination. 34
The importance of the make-whole intent inherent in section
706(g) can be better understood by comparing it to the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA).35 The legislative history of Title VII
documents that section 706(g) was modeled after the remedies sec
tion 10(c) of the NLRA.36 Section lO(c) directs the National Labor
Relations Board "to take such affirmative action including rein
statement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate
the policies of this subchapter. "37 In enacting section 706(g) of Title
VII, Congress directed the courts to look to judicial interpetation
of lO(c) for criteria to determine the appropriateness of rein
statement, backpay, and other affirmative action.
The judicial interpretations of the remedies provision in lO(c)
of the NLRA reinforce the Congressional intent that section 706(g)
have a restorative function. Under the NLRA, awards of backpay
have been liberally granted with the remedy viewed as "a repara
tion order designed to vindicate the public policy of the statute by
32.

Id. § 2000e-5(g) provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in ...
an unlawful employment practice ... the court may enjoin the respondent
... and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may in
clude, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or
without back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appro
priate.
33. 118 CONGo REc. 7166-69 (1972) (section-by-section analysis of H.R. 1746 by
House and Senate Conferees). The 1972 amendments to Title VII provided Congress
with an opportunity to review the purposes of § 706(g). In that review, Congress
made clear that the intent of § 706(g) was to give the courts the discretion "to make
the victims of unlawful discrimination whole." Id. at 7168.
34.
If back pay were awardable only upon a showing of bad faith, the
remedy would become a punishment for moral turpitude, rather than a com
pensation for workers' injuries. This would read the 'make whole' purpose
right out of Title VII, for a worker's injury is no less real simply because his
employer did not inflict it in 'bad faith:
422 U.S. at 422.
35. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
36. See 110 CONGo REC. 7214 (1964) (interpretative memorandum of Senators
Clark and Case); 110 CONGo REC. 6549 (1964) (remarks by Senator Humphrey).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
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making the employees whole for losses suffered on account of an
unfair labor practice. "38 The Supreme Court has stressed the im
portance of backpay awards under the NLRA in "restoring the eco
nomic status quo" of victims of discriminatory employment prac
tices. 39 The National Labor Relations Board and the courts have
consistently upheld the importance of backpay as a remedy for
compensating victims of discrimination for monies lost due to illegal
employment practices. 40
Despite the Congressional intent to award backpay to victims
of Title VII violations, judicial interpretation of the appropriateness
of these awards under the Act has been inconsistent. 41 Section
706(g) lends itself to a variety of interpretations, since it grants the
district courts discretion to award the appropriate relief. Rather
than specifically directing the courts to award relief, the statute
states that the courts "may" award the relief which they deem "ap
propriate. "42 The Supreme Court in Albemarle recognized the dis
cretionary powers vested in the district courts and stated that the
courts applying the provision should be guided by sound· legal
principles consistent with the purposes and objectives of the Act. 43
One reason for the inconsistent application of section 706(g) is
the judicial confusion over whether the employer's culpability in
fostering the employment discrimination should be a factor in
determining relief. 44 Congress clearly stated that only "inadvertent
or accidental discrimination will not violate the title or result in en

38. Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 27 (1952). The Court there reviewed the
recovery available under the provisions of § lO(c) of the NLRA In that case the
Court held that the Board's order requiring an employer to pay backpay was a prova
ble claim in bankruptcy and that the Board, rather than the bankruptcy court, should
liquidate the claim.
39. NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258, 263 (1969). The Supreme
Court in that case upheld the NLRB's order granting reinstatement and backpay to
strikers who had been denied reinstatement to their former positions. The NLRB
computed individual back pay awards, which the court of appeals had modified.
40. See NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 244, 346 (1953).
41. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974),
afJ'd in parl, rev'd. in parl, 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978); Head v. Timken Roller
Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1973); Kober v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 480
F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 464 F.2d 301 (8th Cir.
1972); Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972);
LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 460 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam),
cerl. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th
Cir. 1969).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
43. 422 U.S. at 417-18.
44. See Note, supra note 27.
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try of court orders."45 Some courts had interpreted the application
of section 706(g) to involve a balancing test in which the employer's
"good faith" efforts to abide by the laws are reviewed. When the
courts found that there had been good faith, they used it as justifi
cation for denying relief. 46 The Supreme Court, however, has held
that the employer's "good intent or bad intent" is not relevant to
finding discrimination under Title VIIY Further" it has implicitly
suggested that intent is not relevant in awarding relief under the
remedies section since "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to
the consequences of the employment practices not simply the mo
tivation. "48
Many of the circuit courts of appeal have reviewed awards of
backpay under the "special circumstances" test which closely fol
lows the Congressional intent in the enactment of section 706(g).49
Courts supporting the "special circumstances" test emphasize the
importance of backpay in terminating discrimination and making
the victims of the discriminatory employment practices whole. This
test presumes that backpay should be awarded to victims of em
ployment discrimination and directs the district courts to refuse to
grant backpay relief only in "special circumstances." Few courts
applying this test have actually defined situations in which such
special circumstances are present. 50 The practical effect of the
45. 110 CONGo REC. 12723-24 (1964) (remarks by Senator Humphrey discussing
changes in Title VII and § 706(g)).
46. Good faith is not a defense to a finding of a violation of Title VII, but it is
often viewed as a factor which might limit the remedies available to the defendant.
See Note, supra note 27, at 466. The Court in Albemarle stated that "bad faith" is
not a sufficient reason for denying backpay. Where an employer has shown
bad faith-by maintaining a practice which he knew to be illegal or of
highly questionable legality-he can make no claims whatsoever on the
Chancellor's conscience. But, under Title VII, the mere absence of bad faith
simply opens the door to equity; it does not depress the scales in the em
ployer's favor.
422 U.S. at 422.
47. Griggs V. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (court held that high
school diploma requirement and general intelligence test were not job related and
violated the rights of black employees under Title VII).

48. Id.
49. The "special circumstances" standard for backpay under Title VII was ap
plied in Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974) (re
versed denial of backpay award based on employer's good faith) afI'd in part, rev'd
in part, 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978) (remanded denial of backpay to determine
award under presumption favoring back pay), and Bowe V. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
416 F.2d 711 (7th CiT. 1969) (remanded denial of backpay to women discriminated
against in job classifications and plant seniority).
50. In Pettway V. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 253 (5th Cir.
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"special circumstances" test has been that employees who have suf
fered financially from discriminatory employment practices have
been granted relief uniformly. 51
Retroactive relief under Title VII has also been reviewed un
der a standard of equitable balancing which generally fails to carry
out the Congressional intent. Under this approach, the courts bal
ance the merits of individual claims for relief against the economic
hardships which such relief would impose on the employer. 52 Fac
tors which often weigh in favor of the employer include good faith
attempts by employers to rectifY discrimination and employer's re
liance on statutes and regulations condoning discrimination. 53 Such
balancing often leads to a denial of retroactive relief to employees
and fails to make them whole. 54
The Supreme Court, by reviewing Albemarle, seized an op
portunity to interpret the provisions of section 706(g) and to re
solve the conflict among the circuits. In this case, black employees
1974), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978), the court rejected
past good faith of the company and the possibility of future violations as not being
"special circumstances" which would justify denial of backpay. In Head v. Timken
Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1973), the court rejected good faith of the
employer as a "special circumstance" which would justify denial of relief. But see
Manning v. International Union, 466 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1972), where the court
denied backpay because the employer relied on a state protective statute.
51. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974),
afI'd in part, rev'd in part, 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978); Head v. Timken Roller
Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1973); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791
(4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
52. In Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972),
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded the issue of backpay and di
rected the district court to balance "the various equities between the parties and de
cide upon a result which is consistent with the purposes of the Equal Employment
Opportunities Act, and the fundamental concepts of fairness." [d. at 1006. In
LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 460 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1972), the court
also applied a balancing test, determining that an award of backpay was inappropri
ate because the employer was acting in good faith and the practices were in accord
with state protective laws.
53. State protective statutes have often been relied on by employers to elude
the sanctions of Title VII. State protective statutes are state laws which restrict the
working conditions, hours, and wages of female employees. In Manhart, the Su
preme Court states that Albemarle does not require backpay to be awarded automat
ically. 435 U.S. at 719 n.35. One of the areas which the Court notes may justify de
nial of relief is employer reliance on a state protective statute. The Manhart Court
noted that Albemarle reserved the question of whether this reliance would save a
defendant from liability. See 422 U.S. at 423 n.18.
54. See Kober v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973);
LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel., 460 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1972); Rosenfeld v.
Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971); Garneau v. Raytheon Co., 341 F.
Supp. 336 (D. Mass. 1972); Baxter v. Birkins, 311 F. Supp. 222 (D. Colo. 1970).
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of the Albemarle· Paper Company in Roanoke Rapids, North Caro
lina filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission alleging discriminatory employment practices in viola
tion of Title VII. 55 The employees charged that the company's use
of personality tests and educational requirements was not job
related and was used to restrict minority hiring and promotions.
The district court found that the company's testing programs and
seniority system violated Title VII. The court refused, however, to
grant backpay. It reasoned that the employer's good faith and the
employees' delay in requesting relief justified the denial. 56
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the
judgment of the district court regarding the retroactive relief, and
ruled that backpay should have been granted. 57 The court held
that denying backpay based on the employer's lack of bad faith was
inappropriate. 58 It rejected the district court's application of a bal
ancing test in which the hardships of the employer would be
weighed against the individuals' economic loss. The court enjoined
the discriminatory testing practice and upheld a presumption in fa
vor of backpay to be awarded to "a plaintiff or a complaining class
who is successful in obtaining an injunction under Title VII . . .
unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust. "59
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Albemarle to deter
mine, among other issues,60 the standards by which awards of back
pay should be governed. Implicitly, the Court adopted the "special
circumstances" test by restricting the denial of backpay awards to
situations which "would not frustrate the central statutory purposes
of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making
persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination."61
This presumption, referred to by the Court in Manhart as the
"Albemarle presumption,"62 focuses on the importance of restoring

55. 422 U.S. at 408.
56. 474 F.2d 134, 140-41 (4th Cir. 1973), vacated, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
57. The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that because of the
strong Congressional policy behind backpay awards and the compensatory nature of
the awards, backpay should be granted in all but unusual circumstances. Id. at 142.
58. Id. at 141.
59. Id. at 142 (footnote omitted).
60. The Court also addressed the issue of what an employer must show to "es
tablish that pre-employment tests racially discriminatory in effect, though not in in
tent, are sufficiently 'job related' to survive challenge under Title VII." 422 U.S. at
408.
61. Id. at 421 (footnote omitted).
62. 435 U.S. at 719.

1979]

TITLE VII RETROACTIVE RELIEF

789

the economic status of the employee, rather than mitigating the
hardships of the employer. 63
Courts have subsequently reinforced the standards laid out in
Albemarle and applied the presumption in favor of backpay awards
which was asserted in that case. 64 The United States Supreme
Court, in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 65 applied the
Albemarle standards and reversed the lower court decision which
denied seniority relief to victims of discrimination. The Court held
that the make-whole purpose behind section 706(g) extended to
seniority rights of employees. 66 It failed to find merit in the de
fendant company's argument that the award of seniority relief
would conflict with the economic interests of the other employ
ees. 67 The Court stated that a denial which was based on potential
harm to other employees would frustrate the central make-whole
objective of Title VII. 68
In reviewing the retroactive relief awarded by the lower courts
to the female employees of the Los Angeles Department of Water
and Power, the Supreme Court in Manhart recognized the validity
of the Albemarle presumption favoring retroactive relief. N everthe
63. 422 U.S. at 419-22. The Supreme Court directed the lower courts to recog
nize the purposes of Title VII and to deny backpay only for reasons which will not
frustrate the purposes of the Act. The Court stated that it was "necessary, therefore,
that if a district court does decline to award backpay, it carefully articulate its rea
sons." Id. at 421 n.14 and accompanying text.
64. In Stewart v. General Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445, (7th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 433 U.S. 919 (1977), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reinforced
the Albemarle presumption and directed the district court to follow three general
mechanical rules when reviewing computation of backpay awards: "(I) unrealistic
exactitude is not required; (2) ambiguities in what an employee or group of employ
ees would have earned but for discrimination should be resolved against the discrim
inating employer; (3) the district court . . . must be granted wide discretion in
resolving ambiguities." Id. at 452.
65. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
66. Id. at 774.
67. Id. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting from the majority opinion, found that
"competitive type-seniority relief" would be an inappropriate and inequitable award
because innocent employees would be harmed. Burger recommended that a more
equitable remedy would be a monetary award to the victims of discrimination. Id. at
781. In Manhart, although the victims actually suffered loss of wages and there was
no claim that innocent employees would be harmed by the award, Burger joined in
denying relief. 435 U.S. at 725.
Justice Powell, dissenting, admonished the Court for diminishing the importance
of the discretionary power of the district court to fashion appropriate relief under §
706(g). 424 U.S. at 794. Powell also joined the Court's decision in Manhart, which
overturned the district court's determination of relief and failed to remand the issue.
435 U.S. at 723.
68. Id. at 771.
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less, other factors were deemed more compelling, and the Court
reversed the district court's award of backpay.69 Justice Stevens,
writing for the Court, did not focus on the importance of econom
ically restoring the status of the victims of discrimination as pro
vided by section 706(g). Rather, he emphasized the inequities that
an award of backpay would entail.
A number of factors, according to the Court, favored denying
retroactive relief to the plaintiff employees. First, the confusing
state of administrative regulations pertaining to employment dis
crimination created a morass which might justify the employer
requiring unequal contributions to the pension plan. 70 Next, an
award of backpay would create a precedent which, if applied to
similar plans throughout the country, would adversely affect the
nation's economy.71 Finally, an award of backpay to the female em
ployees who contributed excessively to the plan might jeopardize
the economic stability of the plan in Manhart and result in harm to
all the beneficiaries. 72 The Court stressed that the economic hard
69. Id. at 723.
70. 435 U.S. at 720 n.37. The EEOC guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(e)-(f)
(1977), required equal benefits. The Wage and Hour Administration regulations, 29
C.F.R. § 800.116(d) (1977), only required an employer to equalize his or her em
ployee contributions or benefits. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance, in 41
C.F.R. § 60.20.3(c) (1977), adhered to the Wage and Hour Administration's position.
Until recently, it has been difficult to ascertain which governmental unit had the re
sponsibility for enforcement of the federal equal employment laws. Prior to the ap
proval of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978 prepared by the President and trans
mitted to the Senate and House of Representatives, 14 WEEKLY COMPo OF PRES. 405
(Feb. 27, 1978), 18 governmental units exercised responsibilities under statutes, ex
ecutive orders, and administrative regulations. The Reorganization Plan provides
for the EEOC to become the primary agency in the area of job discrimination, with
the Department of Labor relinquishing many of its responsibilities. The implementa
tion of this Plan is intended to eliminate the conflicting agency regulations in the
employment discrimination area.
71. The Court noted that "[fJifty million Americans participate in retirement
plans other than Social Security. The assets held in trust for these employees are
vast and growing-more than $400 billion were reserved for retirement benefits at
the end of 1976 and reserves are increasing by almost $50 billion a year." 435 U.S. at
721 (footnotes omitted). In Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 98 S. Ct. 2716,
2724 (1978), the Supreme Court cited Manhart to stress the importance of economic
stability and the element of reliance which is vital to the funding of pension plans.
The Court held that the Minnesota Private Pension Benefits Protection Act violated
the contract clause by retroactively modifying the compensation which the employer
agreed to pay to employees.
72. The Court speculated that if the plaintiffs' contributions were recovered
from the pension fund "the administrators of the fund will be forced to meet
unchanged obligations with diminished assets." 435 U.S. at 723. If this happened,
the Court foresaw that the "expectations of all retired employees will be disap
pointed or current employees will be forced to pay not only for their own future se

1979)

TITLE VII RETROACTIVE RELIEF

791

ships to the employer would not serve the goal of eradicating dis
crimination under the Act. 73 Although a backpay award in this case
might not advance the statutory purpose of eliminating discrimina
tion,74 the Court failed to properly review the denial in terms of
the make-whole purpose of the Act. These factors alone are not
sufficient to justify denial of the female employees' claims for
restitutionary relief.
Justice Marshall, dissenting from the denial of backpay relief
in Manhart, did not find the majority's arguments persuasive. He
failed to find that the confusion in the administrative regulations
justified denying relief to the female employees and believed that
during the three-year liability period the administrators of the plan
should have recognized that the unequal contribution requirement
violated the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's guide
lines. 75 Marshall also noted the Court's fear of the potential im
pact that such an award would have on the nation's economy.
He recognized that none of the parties had claimed that the award
would threaten the plan's solvency and argued that the Court
should have restricted its review to the case at hand. 76 Marshall
also rejected as unfounded the Court's fear that an award would re
sult in harm to innocent employees. 77 Marshall's analysis of the
curity but also for the unanticipated reduction in the contributions of past employ
ees." Id. at 722-23 (footnotes omitted).
73. Id. at 722-23.
74. Id. at 720. The Court stated: "There is no reason to believe that the threat
of a backpay award is needed to cause other administrators to amend their practices
to conform to this decision." Id.
75. The Manhart Court found that even assuming that the EEOC's guidelines
should have put the department on notice that the unequal contributions were ille
gal, the date chosen by the district court to determine liability was too early. Id. at
719 n.36. Marshall states that even if the 1972 date was too early for determining lia
bility "during the nearly three year period involved," from April 5, 1972, the date
the EEOC regulations were issued, until December 31, 1974, the date the depart
ment changed to an equal contribution plan, "there surely was some point at which
'conscientious and intelligent administrators' . . . should have responded to the
EEOC guidelines." [d. at 730.
76. Id. at 730-32.
77. Id. at 732. The Supreme Court previously decided that the harmful effect
that backpay would have on employees not victims of the discriminatory employ
ment practices was not relevant in determining relief appropriate under Title VII.
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 V.S. 747 (1976). The Court in Franks found
"untenable the conclusion that this form of relief may be denied merely because the
interests of other employees may thereby be affected." Id. at 775. The Equal Pay
Act, 29 V.S.C.A. §206(d)(I) (1978), prohibits employers from reducing the wage rate
of any employee in order to comply with the provisions of that Act. See also CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 7500 (West Supp. 1975), which expressly prohibits unequal contribu
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award reveals that the factors relied on by the Court to justify de
nial of the award were insufficient to compel denial of backpay.
The Court's emphasis on the "equitable nature of the Title VII
remedies"78 and focus on the hardships of the employer appear
misplaced in Manhart. The intent of the Act as well as the
Albemarle presumption justify granting an award of backpay to
those female employees who had contributed nearly fifteen percent
more than did comparable male employees. Manhart inadequately
deals with the "central statutory purpose of Title VII,"79 making
persons whole for losses suffered as a result of employment dis
crimination. 8o The female employees' claim for relief is "more
compelling" in this case than in many other backpay situations,
since the plaintiffs in Manhart actually received less pay for the
work they performed. This differs from the situation in which the
person who is granted backpay receives wages for a period when
he or she is not working. 81 Certainly, an award of backpay in this
situation would serve the statutory make-whole purpose of Title
VII. 82
In addition to minimizing the importance of restoring the eco
nomic status of the victims of discriminatory employment practices,
Manhart fails to grant proper review to the claim for relief. Prior
to this case, an appellate court reviewing a lower court decision re
garding retroactive relief under Title VII and finding error in the
award would remand the case for a factual determination of the ap
propriateness of the award. 83 Manhart should have been remanded
for further findings to support or deny the backpay relief.84 There
tions, states that increases in the contributions required of members of the plan are
not authorized by the statute.
78. 435 U.S. at 719 (footnote omitted).
79. 422 U.S. at 421.
80. Moroze, Back Pay Awards: A Remedy Under Executive Order 11246, 22
BUFFALO L. REV. 439 (1973); Morse, Judicial Relief Under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,46 TEX. L. REV. 517 (1968).
81. 435 U.S. at 733.
82. See text accompanying notes 32-40 supra.
83. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747,780 (1976); Albemarle Pa
per Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 436 (1975); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.,
494 F.2d 211, 267 (5th Cir. 1974) afI'd in part, rev'd in part, 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir.
1978); Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 1972);
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 721 (7th Cir. 1969).
84. The lower court decisions inadequately address the appropriateness of the
backpay award. Retroactive relief is discussed in Brief for Petitioner for Writ of Cer
tiorari at 28-35, Petitioners' Opening Brief at 37-46 and Respondents' Brief at 55-59,
City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
None of the amici briefs prepared by insurance-related groups addressed the issue of
retroactive relief and the harm such relief might impose on the industry.
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was no record of factual determinations by the district court re
garding computation of the award, and, moreover, the issue of ret
roactive relief was insufficiently briefed and argued in the lower
courtS. 85 The Court usurped the district court's role as factfinder
by refusing to remand the determinations of relief. Consequently,
the Court minimized the importance of the trial court's discretion
to determine the relief appropriate under section 706(g).
Manhart does little to effectuate the intent of section 706(g) in
particular and Title VII in general. The Court refused to return the
female employees who were discriminated against to their proper
economic status. By reviewing the award in terms of the hardships
to the employer and the potential impact on the nation's economy,
the Court failed to implement the purposes for which section
706(g) was enacted. Title VII is not only intended to discourage
discriminatory employment practices, but also, more important,
to make-whole individuals who experienced discrimination. To
achieve these statutory goals courts must emphasize the strength of
the Albemarle presumption which favors awarding backpay relief.
The continuing validity of this presumption mandates that the
Manhart rationale not extend beyond the unique facts of the case.
The goals of Title VII will not be achieved unless those injured by
employment discrimination are restored to the economic status
which they would have enjoyed under nondiscriminatory circum
stances.

Marcia R. Conrad
85. The only record of the determinations of the district court may be seen in
the conclusions of law which were filed with the district court decision granting an
injunction to the department employees. See Petitioner's Brip.f for Certiorari at
B-11-12.

